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INTRODUCTION 
 
 When Michigan passed its tort reform laws in 1996 a provision was adopted – codified at 
M.C.L. § 600.2946(5) – that established a virtual immunity from products liability for drug 
manufacturers. Under this provision, immunity is offered to drug manufacturers as long as the 
drug has been approved by the FDA – what is commonly referred to as a “regulatory compliance 
defense.” When Michigan’s immunity provision was adopted, the FDA’s regulatory process was 
a complex, comprehensive, and quite stringent system that erred on the side on caution. At that 
time, the culture of the FDA centered on ensuring the safety of drugs at the expense of rapid 
approval rates. However, following the most progressive federal legislation targeted at 
drastically decreasing the approval times for promising pharmaceutical products – the FDA 
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Modernization Act of 1997 – the FDA’s culture shifted. Now, the FDA is more focused on rapid 
approval rates, seemingly at the expense of the public health and safety. Many factors have 
contributed to this culture shift; however, a recurrent criticism is that the FDA is increasingly 
beholden to the pharmaceutical industry.  
 In any event, for a variety of significant reasons in addition to the shift in the FDA’s 
culture, a regulatory compliance defense that provides a virtual immunity from tort liability 
based on FDA approval is ill-founded. The failure of other jurisdictions to follow Michigan’s 
lead by adopting similar provisions in the several years following the codification of M.C.L. § 
600.2946(5) lends credibility to this position. Now, since M.C.L. § 600.2946(5) has survived 
attacks on its constitutionality, for the sound reasoning offered in the proceeding sections of this 
article, the Michigan legislature should consider repealing or modifying this section of its tort 
reform legislation and do away with the regulatory compliance defense.  
This article will first review the history of Michigan’s tort reform with respect to M.C.L. 
§ 600.2946(5). Next, the general arguments for and against a strong regulatory compliance 
defense will be examined. The article will then analyze the history of the FDA drug approval 
process and discuss the FDA’s current regulatory climate. Finally, the article will conclude with 
a brief look at some additional specific concerns with a regulatory compliance defense premised 
on FDA approval. 
I. MICHIGAN’S PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY STATUTE. 
 
 In 1996 Michigan became the first state to provide pharmaceutical manufacturers and 
distributors virtual, if not actual, immunity from product liability suits.1 Despite the passage of 
nearly a decade from the adoption of M.C.L. § 600.2946(5) (“Michigan’s Pharmaceutical 
                                                 
1 P.A.1995, No. 249, § 1, Eff. March 28, 1996 (codifying MICH.COMP.LAWS § 600.2946(5) (2004) that allows for an 
unprecedented level of immunity for pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors). 
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Products Liability Statute”), today, Michigan still stands alone in offering pharmaceutical 
companies an unprecedented level of statutory protection from product liability. The operative 
section of Michigan’s Pharmaceutical Products Liability Statute states: 
In a product liability action against a manufacturer or seller, a product that is a 
drug is not defective or unreasonably dangerous, and the manufacturer or seller is 
not liable, if the drug was approved for safety and efficacy by the United States 
food and drug administration, and the drug and its labeling were in compliance 
with the United States food and drug administration's approval at the time the 
drug left the control of the manufacturer or seller.2 
 
This provision, in its essence, statutorily defines reasonable conduct that would shield drug 
manufacturers from liability – creating a “regulatory compliance defense.”  
Looking to regulatory agencies for guidance in establishing what constitutes due care is 
not a novel concept. Courts, under the common law, have traditionally borrowed legislative and 
regulatory standards to define the duty of care under the tort system and have uniformly held that 
violations of those standards create negligence per se, while compliance with those standards 
merely amounts to additional but not conclusive evidence of due care.3 In Grand Trunk Railway 
Co. of Canada v. Ives,4 the United States Supreme Court rendered the first authoritative 
statement on a regulatory compliance defense. In that case, the plaintiff was ultimately harmed 
because of obstructions along the side of a road at a railway crossing. The defendant argued that 
it had complied with all of the applicable regulatory requirements, and as a result, the plaintiff 
should have been precluded from prevailing in its claim because regulatory compliance was 
dispositive of the defendant’s due care. There, the Supreme Court rejected the regulatory 
compliance defense stating: 
                                                 
2 MICH.COMP.LAWS § 600.2946(5) (2004).  
3 Theresa Moran Schwartz, Regulatory Standards and Products Liability: Striking the Right Balance Between the Two, 
30 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 431, 431 (1997). 
4 144 U.S. 408 (1892). 
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The underlying principle in all cases of this kind ... is that neither the legislature 
nor railroad commissioners can arbitrarily determine in advance what shall 
constitute ordinary care or reasonable prudence in a railroad company at a 
crossing, in every particular case which may afterwards arise; ... each case must 
stand upon its own merits, and be decided upon its own facts and circumstances, 
and these are the features which make the question of negligence primarily one 
for the jury to determine, under proper instructions from the court.5 
 
Michigan has generally followed this tradition when relying on various legislation and 
administrative agency standards when developing the standard of care to utilize in particular 
instances.6 Thus, at least on a conceptual level, M.C.L. § 600.2946(5) may be seen as not a 
complete deviance from the traditional concept of borrowing a standard of care from an 
administrative agency. However, M.C.L. § 600.2946(5) is entirely unique because it transcends 
the boundaries of these historical practices by creating a virtual immunity from liability for 
pharmaceutical companies.  
Prior to 1996, the Michigan statute afforded much less protection for pharmaceutical 
companies. The earlier law merely allowed a pharmaceutical company to enter into evidence its 
compliance with federal laws or regulations in order to bolster its defense.7 In other words, it did 
not provide immunity from liability for compliance with laws or regulations and it allowed the 
jury to decide if a pharmaceutical company acted reasonably in products liability claims. The 
1996 changes to law took away the jury’s ability to determine reasonableness and drastically 
increased drug companies’ protections against product liability suits by incorporating the 
virtually impenetrable regulatory compliance defense. 
                                                 
5 See id. at 427. 
6 Dana Cilla, Michigan Tort Reform: A Constitutional Haven for Pharmaceutical Companies and a Tough Pill to 
Swallow for Consumers, 19 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 331, 333 (2002) (citing State Conservation Dep't v. Seaman, 240 
N.W.2d 206  (Mich. 1976); City of Pleasant Ridge v. Romney, 169 N.W.2d 625 (Mich. 1969); Argo Oil Corp. v. 
Atwood, 264 N.W. 285 (Mich. 1935); People v. Soule, 213 N.W. 195 (Mich. 1927); People v. Urban, 206 N.W.2d 
511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973)). 
7 M.C.L. § 600.2946(2) (1978). 
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The policy considerations by those proponents of this immunity provision have been well 
articulated. Essentially, “[t]he 1995 changes to the law are deeply reflective of the legislative 
intent to rectify the trend toward runaway jury verdicts and seemingly frivolous lawsuits with the 
hope of stabilizing corporate liability.”8 The House Legislative Analysis clearly articulated the 
policy reasons for the proposed changes in product liability law as it specifically pertained to 
drug companies:  
[Drug] companies whose products receive FDA approval for safety or 
effectiveness are not liable unless the company deceived the government in the 
approval process. Drug companies spend large sums of money and expend 
enormous energy getting approval for their products. Many valuable products 
never reach the market or are withdrawn because of successful lawsuits (or the 
threat of future lawsuits) even though there is no medical evidence that they are 
harmful.9  
 
In addition, the Senate Fiscal Agency Bill Analysis explained the need to provide heightened 
protection for a manufacturer that has complied with legitimately applicable governmental 
standards:  
It is unfair to deem a product defective when it conforms to applicable 
governmental standards. These standards are promulgated after intense public 
scrutiny, expert evaluation, and thorough product evaluation. Lay jurors should 
not be permitted to second-guess a standard that has been developed by 
government experts.10 
 
 The most recent restatement on torts further supports such a regulatory compliance 
defense offering virtual immunity. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability 
(Restatement (Third)) provides a basic source for the reasoning behind a regulatory compliance 
defense in the products liability arena.11 The Restatement (Third), in § 4b, states: 
A product's compliance with an applicable product safety statute or administrative 
regulation is properly considered in determining whether the product is defective 
                                                 
8 Cilla, supra note 6, at 334. 
9 H. Leg. Analysis 1995 S.B. 344, at 12 (June 8, 1995). 
10 Senate Fiscal Agency Bill Analysis, S.B. 344, at 13 (Jan. 11, 1996). 
11 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (1997) [hereinafter, Restatement (Third)]. 
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with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by the statute or regulation, but such 
compliance does not preclude as a matter of law a finding of product defect.12 
 
This section on its face instructs that the drafters did not intend for a regulatory compliance 
defense in products liability. However, the commentary to the Restatement establishes that this 
basic premise – no regulatory compliance defense – is founded on the notion that product safety 
statutes and regulations are, as a general matter, minimum standards.13 The commentary states: 
Subsection (b) reflects the traditional view that the standards set by most product 
safety statutes or regulations generally are only minimum standards. Thus, most 
product safety statutes or regulations establish a floor of safety below which 
product sellers fall only at their peril, but they leave open the question of whether 
a higher standard of product safety should be applied. This is the general rule, 
applicable in most cases.14 
 
Following this logic, the drafters of the Restatement (Third) explained that a regulatory 
compliance defense may be justified if the statute or regulation: 
[W]as promulgated recently, thus supplying currency to the standard therein 
established; when the specific standard addresses the very issue of product design 
or warning presented in the case before the court; and when the court is confident 
that the deliberative process by which the safety standard was established was 
full, fair, and thorough and reflected substantial expertise.15 
 
Furthermore, just prior to the Restatement (Third), an ALI report entitled, Enterprise 
Responsibility for Personal Injury, supported a regulatory compliance defense under similar 
circumstances requiring “that the regulation be promulgated by a specialized agency with 
domain-specific authority over the risk-creating conduct at the core of the tort claim.”16 Thus, the 
Michigan legislature does not stand alone in at least the acknowledgment of the potential validity 
of a regulatory compliance defense such as that codified in M.C.L. § 600.2946(5).  
                                                 
12 See id. at § 4b. 
13 Restatement (Third), supra note 11, § 4 cmt. e. 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 Robert L. Rabin, Keynote Paper: Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 Geo. L.J. 2049, 2051 (2000) (citing 
American Law Institute, 2 Reporters’ Study on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury 83-110 (1991)). 
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 Despite these justifications for the defense, M.C.L. § 600.2946(5) has been repeatedly 
attacked on a variety of grounds. Recently, Michigan’s Pharmaceutical Products Liability Statute 
was attacked on the grounds that it was an unconstitutional delegation of state legislative power 
to a federal agency.17 In Taylor v. Smithkline Beecham Corporation,18 the Michigan Supreme 
Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision that found M.C.L. § 600.2946(5) unconstitutional 
and held that the statute did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power.19 Since it appears 
as though Michigan’s regulatory compliance defense is constitutional, it is necessary to rely on 
other reasoning for why the justifications for M.C.L. § 600.2946(5) and its efficacy should be 
reconsidered. The remainder of this article will explore these issues.       
II. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING A REGULATORY COMPLIANCE DEFENSE. 
Numerous persons argue for a stronger regulatory compliance defense; the vast majority 
of whom are members of a larger group that criticizes the product liability system more 
generally.20 The many wide-ranging attacks on the product liability system include claims that it: 
is “too costly and erratic,”21 reduces the affordability and availability of insurance,22 drastically 
increases the prices of some products,23 deters innovation (especially in the pharmaceutical 
industry),24 slows the development and marketing of products,25 unduly burdens interstate 
                                                 
17 Taylor v. Gate Pharmaceuticals, 248 Mich.App. 472; 639 N.W.2d 45 (2001). 
18 468 Mich. 1; 658 N.W.2d 127 (2003). 
19 Id. 
20 Schwartz, supra note 3, at 436-37. 
21 See id. (citing Newt Gingrich et al., Contract with America 143 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994); American 
Law Inst., Reporters' Study: Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury Vol. 2, at 50 (1991); President's Council 
on Competitiveness, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America 1-6 (1991); Tort Policy Working Group, U.S. 
Attorney Gen., Report on the Causes, Extent and Policy Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability 
and Affordability 30-52, 60-75 (1986)). 
22 See id. (citing Tort Policy Working Group, supra note 23, at 45-52). 
23 See id. (citing Brown v. Superior Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 479 (Cal. 1988)). 
24 See id. (citing Peter W. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences 155-61 (1988)). 
25 Schwartz, supra note 3, at 436-37 (citing Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 
104th Cong. s 2(a)(4) (1996) (vetoed); Brown, 751 P.2d at 479). 
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commerce,26 and reduces the United States’ competitiveness in the global marketplace.27 By 
effectively spinning these various arguments against the product liability system, these critics 
have been quite successful in pushing for product liability reforms that generously benefit the 
manufacturing industry while “generously” harming the victims of defective products. 
Over the last decade or more, proposed and enacted reforms have included various 
measures that make bringing or winning claims more difficult and typically institute caps on 
recoverable damages for the few persons who are able to successfully overcome those reforms’ 
other impediments.28 Some tort reform proposals have been exceedingly harsh, asking for 
extreme damage caps on non-economic losses and provisions to require the losing party to pay 
all attorney fees.29 Moreover, numerous tort reform proposals have allowed for a strengthened 
regulatory compliance defense though not generally proposing a virtual immunity to tort liability 
as is the case in Michigan tort reform. However, unlike the Michigan tort reform law, most 
proposals to strengthen the regulatory compliance defense have been based on more solid policy 
grounds and have not been as harsh as other provisions in the proposals.30  
The basic thrust of the arguments supporting a strong regulatory compliance defense is 
that regulatory agencies, such as the FDA, have greater expertise than do judges and juries for 
determining reasonable product safety.31 Moreover, such agencies are also superior to courts in 
making the necessary technical and policy decisions involved with products; especially products 
                                                 
26 See id. (citing H.R. 956, s 2(a)(3)). 
27 See id. (citing Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner, The Anti-Competitive Impact of U.S. Product Liability 
Laws: Are Foreign Businesses Beating Us at Our Own Game?, 9 J.L. & Com. 167, 169 (1989)). 
28 See Martha Middleton, A Changing Landscape, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 56, 59 (offering a summary of the various 
state tort law reform over approximately the last decade.). 
29 Schwartz, supra note 3, at 439. 
30 See id. (citing Product Liability Fairness Act, S. 640, 102d Cong. s 303(c) (1991)). 
31 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Rationalizing the Relationship Between Product Liability and 
Innovation in Tort Law and the Public Interest 125 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991). 
 9
with a high level of technical complexity such as pharmaceuticals.32 Plus, agencies like the FDA 
should have greater access to all of the relevant information through their rulemaking 
procedures.33 Simply put, “these proponents contend that government standards, crafted by 
experts and developed through a quasi-legislative process, are more likely to be sound and 
consistent measures of reasonable safety than those set on a case-by-case basis by judges and 
juries.”34 
More specifically on point with this article, numerous commentators have argued that the 
FDA is a model example of an agency that warrants the application of a strong regulatory 
compliance defense to pharmaceutical products.35 Various assertions are proffered to support this 
position. For one, such proponents claim that the regulatory system for pharmaceuticals is more 
comprehensive than systems for other products, requiring lengthy, scientific examination before 
these products are offered to the public – thus, arguably providing product safety standards 
above the minimum requirements and potentially approaching optimal requirements.36 
Additionally, pharmaceuticals are such a valuable product to society that a heightened regulatory 
compliance defense is necessary to limit the scope of liability and encourage the more expedient 
production of innovative, effective, and potentially life saving drugs.37  Moreover, a regulatory 
compliance defense based on FDA approval will necessarily provide consistent and predictable 
                                                 
32 See, e.g., Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 98-99 (Utah 1991). 
33 See Clarence Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 21, 47 (1949); see also 
Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 176 (Cal. 1993). 
34 Schwartz, supra note 3, at 439 (citing Paul Dueffert, Note, The Role of Regulatory Compliance in Tort Actions, 26 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 208 (1989); Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims As the 
Government Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903, 965 (1996)). 
35 See, e.g., William G. Childs, The Implementation of FDA Determinations in Litigation: Why Do We Defer to the PTO 
but Not to the FDA?, 5 Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. 155 (2004); Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The 
Pursuit of Symmetry in Products Liability, 88 Geo. L.J. 2147 (2000).   
36 See Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan, Overview, in The Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability Law on Safety and 
Innovation 1, 13 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991). 
37 See Lars Noah, Triage in the Nation’s Medicine Cabinet: The Puzzling Scarcity of Vaccines and Other Drugs, 54 S.C. 
L. Rev. 741 (2002). 
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standards that proponents argue are currently unnecessarily confusing and unpredictable.38 All of 
this, it is argued, makes FDA approval the optimum foundation for a strong regulatory 
compliance defense. 
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST A REGULATORY COMPLIANCE DEFENSE. 
Despite the arguments for a stronger regulatory compliance defense, this author’s 
position is that such a defense in general and specifically premised on FDA decisions is neither 
suited nor adequate to the necessary purposes of the products liability tort system. A variety of 
important propositions and concerns support this position. For one, the legislature and the 
agencies on which the regulatory compliance defense is premised are unduly influenced by the 
respective industries – namely the pharmaceutical industry in this case. Additionally, political 
influences weigh heavily on regulatory decision-making causing a state of flux that is 
incompatible with product liability law. Also, more simply, regulatory standards are not a good 
match with the tort system and were not designed to be so. Related to this is the fact that 
regardless of the state of tort law in Michigan at this time, one purpose of product liability law 
should be to ensure compensation to its citizens in accidental harm situations and promote broad 
risk-spreading on the part of product manufacturers. A regulatory compliance defense is simply 
not consistent with this purpose. Plus, a regulatory compliance defense does not serve the tort 
system’s purpose of eliciting information about risk and aberrant conduct. Moreover, we should 
not put faith during this highly technological era in regulatory agencies, such as the FDA, to keep 
pace with frantic technological advancements. More likely than not, the pharmaceutical industry 
at times will outpace the FDA’s regulations, and as a result, regulatory compliance will not 
provide adequate safety standards for tort liability purposes. 
                                                 
38 Schwartz, supra note 3, at 441-42. 
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Fundamentally, a legitimate regulatory compliance defense must necessarily be grounded 
in objective regulatory standards. Thus, if the regulatory agency charged with approving 
products, such as pharmaceuticals, is heavily influenced by the industry being regulated or 
another interested industry, then the respective regulatory compliance defense is ill-founded. In 
general, government agencies must extensively rely on the industries that they are regulating 
because the industries know more about the details, data, cost and benefits, and risks of their own 
products.39 The pharmaceutical industry is not an exception to this rule. Pharmaceutical 
companies clearly have greater technological expertise with respect to their products, as 
successful pharmaceutical companies only employ the best and the brightest persons to develop 
marketable and profitable drugs. Moreover, nothing can refute the fact that pharmaceutical 
companies have greater knowledge of the details of their products than the FDA could ever have 
despite the FDA’s extensive disclosure requirements. Because of this, the FDA must rely heavily 
on the pharmaceutical industry’s candidness and cooperation, and as a result, the industry exerts 
incredible influence on the agency and its regulatory determinations. Plus, what will be 
subsequently discussed in more detail, is the fact that the “user fee” provision adopted in the 
FDA Modernization Act creates even greater FDA reliance on the industry and increases 
industry influence. These facts seriously undermine the credibility of a regulatory compliance 
defense premised on FDA approval. 
Moreover, politics permeates any regulatory process. Of course, the degree to which 
politics plays a role in a particular regulatory agency varies, but nevertheless, politics still has its 
effect.  For instance, during the Reagan era, deregulation was a prominent political platform in 
                                                 
39 See id. (citing Joan Claybrook, Retreat from Safety: Reagan’s Attack on America’s Health xxiv-xxv (1984) for the 
proposition that “the government has far less information than the regulated industry with which to make key 
regulatory decisions”). 
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an effort to provide regulatory relief for businesses.40 Specifically, the FDA was hard hit during 
this era, suffering serious resource cutbacks. As a result, the number of FDA enforcement actions 
was drastically reduced41 and proposed regulatory actions were stymied.42 This culminated in a 
stream of scandals at the FDA.43 As one commentator succinctly put it: “Whatever the impact, 
and however deep and long lasting, one thing is clear: the regulatory environment shifts with the 
political environment. Such shifts should raise serious concerns for the judiciary about relying on 
the regulatory system to set the safety standards for the tort system.”44    
 In a more general sense, regulatory standards are simply not suited for establishing 
standards for products liability cases. When courts determine what standards fit a particular case 
they necessarily analyze whether the standard promotes the purpose of the statute in question and 
whether the standard addresses the type of injury in question.45 In Michigan, the legislature has 
made these determinations without fully exploring whether the FDA standards address the types 
of injuries in question. Specifically, the legislature has not established that the FDA, when 
making its decisions, contemplates the ramifications its decisions have on legitimate products 
liability claims and the potential limiting effect on an injured person’s compensation for his or 
her injuries. Perhaps, if the FDA was aware of the fact that its decisions were being used for such 
purposes, the FDA’s decision-making process may substantially differ from its current practices. 
                                                 
40 See Teresa Moran Schwartz, A Product Safety Agenda for the 1990s, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1355, 1362-66 (1988). 
41 See Julie Kosterlitz, Reagan is Leaving His Mark on the Food and Drug Administration, 17 NAT'L J. 1568, 1569-71 
(1985 
42 Schwartz, supra note 3, at 447. 
43 See id. at n. 80 (listing several scandals including: “One major fraud on the FDA in the 1980s--when the FDA, in 
effect, had ‘stopped being a regulatory agency’-- involved the bribery of FDA staff by generic drug industry 
members;” “a manufacturer of heart catheters who lied to the FDA about the experimental use of its devices, sold 
devices without FDA approval, and covered up its actions. The FDA ordered a recall of the products by 1990 and 
then pursued criminal charges. . . . The criminal prosecution resulted in a $61 million fine--the largest fine ever 
imposed in an FDA enforcement case;” and “[s]till another instance of wrongdoing in the 1980s involved Eli Lilly’s 
failure to reveal serious adverse reactions experienced by English users of its drug Oraflex. . . . The drug was 
approved, promoted heavily, and caused an estimated 50 deaths before it was withdrawn from the U.S. market.” 
44 Schwartz, supra note 3, at 448. 
45 See id. (explaining that “[f]urthering the safety aims of the statute has become the principal rationale for borrowing 
standards in tort cases.”). 
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 Moreover, there are a variety of justifications for a strict products liability system that 
equally apply as criticisms of the regulatory compliance defense. For example, the “enterprise 
liability” doctrine suggests that manufacturers such as pharmaceutical companies are in a 
position to more easily distribute the costs of injuries from defective products by raising prices or 
purchasing insurance.46 Drug companies implicitly represent that their products are safe and in 
fact, FDA approval strengthens this presumption with respect to consumers creating, in essence, 
an explicit representation of the product’s safety.47 As such, consumers are justified in relying on 
these representations and should not be punished by being barred from securing their just 
compensation for injuries from defective products. What follows is that drug companies should 
be if not strictly liable for injuries statistically associated with the manufacturing enterprise, at 
least legally responsible for injuries resulting from their negligence in manufacturing the drugs. 
Such liability is merely “a cost of doing business that should be born by someone other than 
injured individuals.”48   
 More simply, the regulatory compliance defense is generally unfair. Drug companies 
enjoy vast benefits by putting their products into the stream of commerce and they should also 
accept the few disadvantages such as the costs of injuries resulting from their negligence.49 Also, 
the regulatory compliance defense is undermined by the theory of “nonreciprocal risks” – the 
theory that “the manufacturer imposes risks on the consumer that are quite different from any 
risks the consumer imposes on the manufacturer.”50 In the context of pharmaceutical companies, 
the consumer is faced with grave risks of being seriously injured or killed by defective drugs for 
                                                 
46 DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 626 (4th ed. 2001). 
47 See id. (explaining that “[m]anufacturers implicitly represent that the products they make are safe and healthy, and 
consumers are justified in relying [on] that implicit representation”). 
48 See id. at 627. 
49 See id. (explaining that “because the manufacturer enjoys the advantages of sending its products into commerce, it 
should also take the disadvantages in the form of injury costs when the risks of such activity come to fruition”). 
50 See id. 
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the sake of society’s need for innovative and effective products; however, the consumer does not 
impose a comparable risk on the drug company. Fundamentally, no injured person should be 
required to sacrifice his or her legitimate claim against a defendant manufacturer for the benefit 
of the common good.   
Still another attack on the regulatory compliance defense is that the tort system provides a 
valuable mechanism for “educating the public about unscrupulous and socially dangerous 
business practices detrimental to the public health.”51 At the very least, the products liability 
system serves a positive function by revealing the concealment of risk information from the 
FDA.52 But, this valuable function is eviscerated by the regulatory compliance defense since it 
leaves this fraud-finding function in the hands of the regulatory agency. Of course, proponents of 
the regulatory compliance defense will point out that the Michigan statute does not provide the 
regulatory compliance defense to a pharmaceutical company that commits a fraud such as 
withholding risk information from the FDA. Generally, those proposing such statutes do include 
a fraud exception to the defense. The Michigan statute specifically states that the regulatory 
compliance defense does not apply to a company that “[i]ntentionally withholds from or 
misrepresents to the United States food and drug administration information concerning the drug 
that is required to be submitted under the federal food, drug, and cosmetic act . . . and the drug 
would not have been approved, or the United States food and drug administration would have 
withdrawn approval for the drug if the information were accurately submitted.”53  
Thus, on the surface it appears that the Michigan statute does not undermine the tort 
system’s valuable function of revealing the concealment of risk information from the FDA. 
                                                 
51 Rabin, supra note 16, at 2068. 
52 See id. at 2069 (citing Teresa Moran Schwartz, Punitive Damages and Regulated Products, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1335, 
1348-52 (1993) for examples of the concealment problem arising in FDA licensing cases). 
53 M.C.L. § 2946(5)(a) (2005). 
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However, it is first important to note that “it often takes more broadly applicable theories than 
fraud to uncover fraud.”54 As a result, the fraud exception to the defense may not be enough to 
allow the tort system to fully realize its fraud revealing function. But more importantly, the most 
recent case considering the fraud exception issue with respect to Michigan’s product liability 
statute, Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories,55 confirms that despite this fraud exception in the 
statute, the tort system’s function of revealing fraud is entirely undermined.  
The Garcia court explained that state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims seriously conflict 
with the FDA’s requirement to police fraud in a way that is consistent with the FDA’s judgment 
and objectives.56 The court then noted that the specific exception for fraud on the FDA to the 
general immunity provided by Michigan’s regulatory compliance defense is distinguishable from 
a general state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claim.57 Nevertheless, it concluded that the difference was 
immaterial and that “remedies requiring proof of fraud committed against the FDA are 
foreclosed since federal law preempts such claims.”58 Thus, the court held that the only findings 
of fraud that may be utilized to establish the fraud exception under Michigan’s Pharmaceutical 
Products Liability Statute are findings made by the FDA itself.59 Because of federal preemption, 
the state court is not allowed to humor findings of fraud other than federal findings. Clearly, this 
entirely undermines the tort system’s function of uncovering such fraud since, according to 
Garcia, this function is wholly in the Agency’s hands. Plus, evidence indicates that the tort 
                                                 
54 Rabin, supra note 16, at 2068 (explining that “[f] raud is in fact a narrowly defined claim. For example, traditionally 
one must establish scienter and offer ‘clear and convincing’ evidence to prevail.”). 
55 385 F.3d 961 (6th Cir. 2004). 
56 Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, 385 F.3d 961, 965 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Buckman Co. v. Pls.’ Legal Comm., 
531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001)). 
57 See id. at 965-66. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. at 966 (explaining that “[i]n the final analysis, the exemptions are invalid as applied in some settings (e.g., 
when a plaintiff asks the state court to find bribery or fraud on the FDA) but not in others (e.g., claims based on 
federal findings of bribery or fraud on the FDA).”). 
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system does play this fraud-revealing role with some regularity.60 Ultimately, “if the tort 
system’s role in educating the public about serious health risks and profit-driven efforts to 
conceal those risks is regarded as socially important, unconstrained tort action is very arguably 
called for.”61 
Another serious problem arises when regulatory standards cannot keep pace with 
technological change.62 The administrative rulemaking procedures often cause severe lags in 
time between the necessary change in standards and the conditions that necessitated such 
changes.63 “As a consequence, government standards frequently become outdated, and are 
therefore poor measures of safety for the tort system.”64 Thus, the applicable FDA approval 
standards might not have been suitable at the time injury occurred to warrant a regulatory 
compliance defense. In fact, this “regulatory lag” problem has been previously evidenced with 
respect to the FDA. For example, the rule that classified breast implants as a “high risk device” 
took six years to complete and another three years to finalize.65 Also, it took the FDA 
approximately two decades to complete its massive review of prescription drugs that led to the 
recall of over a thousand different drugs that were on the market.66 The FDA acknowledges this 
problem and only expects it to grow.67 
Related to the problem of technology outpacing regulatory standards is the problem of 
limited government resources. The government functions on a supply of limited resources, and 
                                                 
60 See Rabin, supra note 16, at 2070 (pointing to asbestos and tobacco litigation as prime examples). 
61 See id. 
62 Schwartz, supra note 3, at 444-45. 
63 See id. at 445. 
64 See id. at 444-45 (noting that “risks became known in 1970 that were not available when FDA's regulation of oral 
contraceptives was issued in 1968” and that in Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 379 (N.J. 1984), “the 
manufacturer and the FDA had knowledge of risks, but that the FDA failed to act before plaintiff's injury”). 
65 Schwartz, supra note 3, at 444 n. 62. 
66 See id. at 445, n. 61. 
67 See generally Advisory Comm. on the Food and Drug Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Final Report 
(1991). 
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as a result, it is often the case that an agency such as the FDA lacks the necessary resources to 
properly review the data submitted to it by the industry.68 This is especially the case with an 
agency such as the FDA that has the most comprehensive regulatory responsibilities.69 This lack-
of-funding problem is compounded when either an agency’s jurisdiction is expanded or the 
number and prevalence of products under its purview dramatically increases and there is no 
corresponding increase in funding.70 Historically, this phenomenon has negatively impacted the 
effectiveness of the FDA. The FDA has noted, for example, that between 1980 and 1990 its 
jurisdiction was greatly expanded and the number and complexity of products under its purview 
drastically increased but it did not receive the necessary increase in funding or staffing to 
adequately monitor or regulate the drug industry.71 It will be explained later that the problem has 
been somewhat alleviated by the “user fee” provision in the FDA Modernization Act of 1997; 
however, there is no guarantee that this problem will not occur again in the future. All of the 
aforementioned issues weigh heavily against the regulatory compliance defense, especially one 
like Michigan’s that provides a virtual immunity from tort liability. 
IV. THE FDA’S DRUG APPROVAL HISTORY AND CURRENT REGULATORY CLIMATE. 
Today, “[t]he [FDA] is caught in pincers between two intense political pressures: 
demands from the industry and the political right to move faster and faster in approving drugs, 
and rising insistence from consumer groups and the left to show more caution.”72 Within the last 
couple of decades, the public and the scientific community have criticized the FDA for its 
protracted approval process. Congress has responded to these concerns by enacting legislation 
                                                 
68 Schwartz, supra note 3, at 446. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. 
71 Advisory Comm. on the Food and Drug Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Final Report at 15-17, app. 
C at 2-3; 9-10 (1991). 
72 Alison R. McCabe, A Precarious Balancing Act – The Role of the FDA as Protector of Public Health and Industry 
Wealth, 36 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 787, 787 (2003) (quoting Rochelle Sharpe, FDA Tries to Find Right Balance on 
Drug Approvals, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1999, at A24). 
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that requires the pharmaceutical industry to fund the FDA’s approval process in return for 
expedited approval times.73 
Now, however, people are questioning whether the FDA has become a “servant to the 
industry” rather than the protector of the public health.74 Many think that the legislation 
Congress enacted with the intent to expedite approval rates was successful in that aim but only at 
the expense of drug safety.75 In fact, the recent upsurge in drug recalls and drug related injuries 
and deaths are considered by many to be the result of hasty drug approvals.76 Arguably, as a 
result of this legislation, the FDA has become more dependent on industry funding and is 
allowing the pharmaceutical industry to seize control of public health from the Agency. 
Currently, the primary mission of the FDA is to enforce the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetics Act of 1938 (FFDCA) – thus, regulating food, drugs, labeling, cosmetics, and medical 
devices. In 1962, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments (“Drug Amendments”)77 were the beginning 
of a trend of reforms that culminated in the rigorous pre-market approval standard that in some 
circumstances is still applied today. This pre-market approval process begins with a 
pharmaceutical company’s submission of an investigational new drug application (“INDA”).78 
However, before the INDA is filed, the pharmaceutical company, to evaluate the preliminary 
safety, must conduct approximately 3 ½ years of laboratory and animal testing on the drug.79 
After receiving this application, the FDA will either approve or reject the INDA. If the INDA is 
approved, the pharmaceutical company then may begin the necessary three phases of human 
                                                 
73 Id. at 788. 
74 See id. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. 
77 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780. 
78 See Elizabeth M. Rutherford, The FDA and Privatization--The Drug Approval Process, 50 FOOD DRUG L.J. 203, 212-
13 (1995) (summarizing the FDA’s approval process). 
79 See id. 
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clinical studies.80 Phase I is devoted to evaluating safety and lasts approximately one year.81 
Phase II focuses on efficacy, side effects, and dosing and lasts approximately two years.82 
Finally, Phase III lasts approximately three years, which is used to gather additional data on the 
safety and efficacy of the drug.83 Once all of the Phases of testing are complete, the 
pharmaceutical company files a new drug application (“NDA”) with the FDA containing all of 
the clinical data – this complete application may be as long as 100,000 pages or more.84 Due to 
the enormity of the application, it typically takes the FDA thirty months to review the NDA. In 
order to expedite this lengthy process, the Drug Amendments did allow a generic drug 
manufacturer to submit an abbreviated new drug application if it could establish that its proposed 
drug was essentially a “bioequivalent” of a drug that had already been approved.85 
By the 1980’s, the public was becoming impatient with this complex and lengthy drug 
approval process because the FDA was impeding the approval of several promising life-saving 
drugs.86 The scientific community was generally in agreement on this issue and also pressed for a 
more modernized and streamlined new drug investigation and approval process.87 As a result, in 
1992, the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (“PDUFA”)88 was enacted. This act somewhat 
loosened the drug approval standard and it also required pharmaceutical companies to pay “user 
fees” when promoting new drugs.89 These fees are used to fund the FDA’s drug approval process 
                                                 
80 See id. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
83 Rutherford, supra note 78, at 212-13 (summarizing the FDA’s approval process). 
84 See id. 
85 McCabe, supra note 72, at 791. 
86 See id. (pointing to potential Alzheimer’s drugs as a prime example of those being impeded by the FDA approval 
process).  
87 See id. at 792; see also Jennifer Kulynych, Will FDA Relinquish the "Gold Standard" for New Drug Approval? 
Redefining "Substantial Evidence" in the FDA Modernization Act of 1997, 54 FOOD DRUG L.J. 127, 141 (1999).  
88 Pub. L. No. 102-571, Title I, §  102, 105 Stat. 4491 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § §  379g, 379h). 
89 McCabe, supra note 72, at 792. 
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in order to help expedite the approval of life saving and other important drugs.90 Ultimately, the 
purpose of the PDUFA was to reduce the review time for new drug applications by about fifty-
percent, which is intended to benefit the public by expediting the approval of beneficial and life 
saving drugs, but also to benefit the pharmaceutical companies by making the industry more 
profitable.91 
The PDUFA was extremely effective in reducing FDA drug approval times, and it was 
subsequently reauthorized in the FDA Modernization Act (“FDAMA”).92 However, the FDA’s 
utilization of user fees to fund its staff among other things most definitely raises the specter of 
greater industry influence because of the FDA’s increased reliance on industry funding. 
Moreover, the FDAMA raises other concerns over whether a regulatory compliance defense to 
products liability can appropriately be founded on FDA approval. Following FDAMA’s 
enactment, the FDA has set aggressive performance goals, management goals, and procedural 
goals intended to drastically reduce the review and approval time for new drug applications.93 
Arguably these aggressive approval time reductions are not proportionate with the supposed 
increased effectiveness that the FDA expects to achieve through the user fees.  Also, FDAMA 
codifies and expands the FDA’s current regulations regarding pharmaceutical products that are 
eligible for accelerated drug approval.94  In fact, the scope of drugs that are now eligible for “fast 
track” approval is severely broadened as a result of FDAMA.95   
                                                 
90 See id. 
91 See id. (explaining that the pharmaceutical companies gain tremendous economic benefits from expedited approval 
times because the effective patent life of the drug is not reduced by the more time consuming procedures). 
92 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1997). 
93 Parver, supra note 93, at 1259-1260 (explaining that “[i]n return for the increased resources provided by user fees, the 
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94 See id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 105-310, at 54). 
95 See id. 
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The fast track program under FDAMA allows a pharmaceutical company to request fast 
track approval at any time during the approval process on a rolling review basis.96 This means 
that an application can be reviewed even if it is incomplete if the drug company can show signs 
of efficacy.97 The typical method by which a drug meets the necessary safety and efficacy 
standards is by demonstrating its “effect on a clinical endpoint, such as morbidity or mortality, or 
on a validated surrogate endpoint, such as cholesterol levels or blood pressure.”98 However, 
FDAMA allows a drug to be “fast tracked” if it is demonstrated that the drug has an effect on a 
“surrogate endpoint that is reasonably likely to predict a clinical benefit.”99 In other words, the 
clinical benefits are merely suggested but not proven.100 Because of the expedited nature of these 
fast track approvals under uncertain conditions, the FDA requires subsequent post-approval 
requirements and retains the ability to expeditiously withdraw a drug after only an informal 
hearing.101 All of this suggests that such approvals are not an appropriate foundation for a 
regulatory compliance defense, especially in light of the numerous recent withdrawals of such 
drugs from the market by the FDA.  
Essentially, the FDA is confronted with conflicts arising within its ambit of protecting the 
public’s health and safety. On one hand, the FDA should not hastily approve a drug that will 
subsequently be found to be unsafe after being thrust into the marketplace because it is 
“reasonably likely to predict a clinical benefit.”102 On the other hand, the FDA should not 
unnecessarily delay the approval of an ultimately safe and highly beneficial drug that may 
                                                 
96 See id. at 1261. 
97 See id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 105-310, at 56). 
98 See id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 105-310, at 54). 
99 FDA Modernization Act §  112(b)(1). 
100 Parver, supra note 93, at 1262 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 105-310, at 54). 
101 See id. 
102 See Rutherford, supra note 78, at 214 (“The drug reviewer's job highlights the problem of few or misplaced 
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positively effect or even save lives.103 With respect to these conflicts, prior to FDAMA’s 
enactment, the FDA erred on the side of caution, favoring unnecessary delay over the potential 
hasty approval of a promising but unsafe drug.104 This was due to a variety of factors including: 
“political pressure for safe drugs, rather than fast review times; a complex regulatory framework; 
and a highly deferential judiciary.”105 Politically, the FDA reviewers were subject to intense 
congressional examination, professional criticism, and were likely lose their jobs if a bad 
judgment was made.106 The complex regulatory framework, which was self evident, caused 
substantial delay in approval times and was fostered by the political climate prior the enactment 
of FDAMA.107 Lastly, the deference that the FDA received from the judiciary prior to FDAMA 
discouraged the FDA from functioning more effectively and efficiently.108 Ultimately, the FDA’s 
mindset was to delay approval rather than suffer another Thalidomide debacle.109 
However, after FDAMA’s enactment, the FDA is seemingly more focused on approving 
drugs as hurriedly as it can with diminished respect for its duty to protect the public’s health.110 
Now, rather than the FDA reviewer’s performance being linked to the safety of the drugs 
approved, his or her performance is now directly linked to the number of drugs approved as a 
result of FDAMA’s ambitious performance goals.111 Moreover, pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
                                                 
103 See id. 
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physicians, and Wall Street exert tremendous pressure on the FDA for rapid approval rates.112 
Even more alarming is the fact that since FDAMA the FDA is working more closely with the 
drug manufacturer during the approval process – raising the specter of industry influence and 
undermining the FDA’s necessary objectivity. As a result of all of this, following FDAMA, 
record numbers of approved drugs have been recalled by the FDA because the drugs later proved 
to be harmful.113 Arguably, “[t]he current system of testing new drugs may be too brief to detect 
harmful reactions that could surface after repeated use.”114 
The public’s response to this precarious situation following FDAMA “has recurrently 
been one of doubt, distrust, and fear.”115 Many critics believe that the FDA simply caters to the 
drug companies that fund it and are altogether indifferent to the needs for public safety and its 
review process.116 In fact, many FDA drug reviewers admit that they are pressured to approve 
questionable drugs by the powers that be – i.e. the pharmaceutical industry, Congress, and even 
FDA senior officials.117 Now, some previous advocates of expedited approval rates find 
themselves reversing their opinion after observing the market being flooded with “poorly tested 
drugs of unknown efficacy.”118 Evidence suggests that such rapidly approved drugs later found 
to be harmful are often the result of FDA oversight, the drug company’s reliance on outdated or 
insufficient data, or insufficient long-term testing.119  
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These facts drastically undermine the appropriateness of a regulatory compliance defense 
founded on FDA approvals. One author states: “Because it is fundamentally infeasible to identify 
all of a drug’s attendant risks and side effects, the FDA endeavors to regulate and enforce the 
proper use of drugs during the post-approval period.”120 This means that currently in Michigan 
because of the blanket immunity provided by the regulatory compliance defense, unwarrantedly 
injured persons have no redress for those injuries caused by unsafe drugs between the time the 
drug is hastily approved and the time it takes the FDA to properly investigate and withdraw the 
drug during the post-approval period. Simply put, the FDA’s current regulatory process is not 
commensurate with what is necessary for the proper foundation of a regulatory compliance 
defense, if such a foundation even exists.  
V. SOME ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO FDA APPROVAL AND 
MICHIGAN’S REGULATORY COMPLIANCE DEFENSE. 
 
As previously mentioned, the FDA approval process is considered by many to be the 
strongest case for a regulatory compliance defense. According to such regulatory compliance 
proponents, the FDA drug approval process is a comprehensive regulatory scheme founded on 
scientific expertise, and the product being approved is extremely important for public health.121 
As such, these proponents argue that the manufacturers of important drugs approved under the 
rigorous FDA approval process deserve relief from burdensome tort litigation.122 They consider 
the tort system an over-deterrence for imposing liability on manufacturers when they were in 
compliance with these comprehensive and rigorous standards; and also a substantial deterrence 
even when there is ultimately no liability because of the substantial litigation costs of defending 
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such claims.123 In fact, critics of the tort system’s effect on the pharmaceutical industry have 
pointed to the FDA’s approval process stating that it “so stringent as to have created a drug lag 
that prevents American consumers from gaining access to new pharmaceuticals on a timely 
basis.”124 This fact, it is argued, coupled with the tort system’s effects, creates a sort of double-
deterrence that is detrimental to the effective manufacture and marketing of important and 
potentially life-saving drugs and is ultimately detrimental to the public health – thus, the need for 
a regulatory compliance defense.  
Of course, you will find few if any authorities who propose that a regulatory compliance 
defense, such as Michigan’s, is warranted when the governing regulatory body merely sets 
minimum safety standards.125 This is, no doubt, one reason why the Michigan legislature has 
chosen only to apply the regulatory compliance defense to FDA decisions. Although many critics 
of the FDA proclaim that FDA standards are minimum standards, the more realistic view is that 
this is not the case.126 This does not mean that FDA standards are optimal, however, for all of the 
reasons previously discussed throughout this article – especially with respect to those drugs 
approved through the “fast track” process. However, even if we assume that, in the least, the 
FDA approval process is optimally rigorous, it is still not the case that the tort system would 
have this double-deterrent effect. 
 If, for example, the majority of states do not adopt a regulatory compliance defense then 
there will be only a negligible lessening of deterrence since drug companies will still be faced 
with substantial liability in the majority of jurisdictions. Thus, a potential justification for 
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Michigan’s regulatory compliance defense is moot. But, on the other hand, if the vast majority of 
jurisdictions do eventually adopt a regulatory compliance defense similar to Michigan’s, then a 
“compensation void” will result.127 The ultimate effect of this would be an increase in political 
pressure to minimize injuries from products because of the unavailability of compensation for 
severely injured persons.128 In effect, the overdeterrence argument for a regulatory compliance 
defense is reliant on the fact that “the agency would continue to operate free of any internal or 
external bureaucratic/political demands to ratchet up the stringency of its approval process in a 
world where tort remedies for drug-related injuries were nonexistent.”129 In reality, this is simply 
not the case. 
 There are still other reasons why the regulatory compliance defense based on FDA 
approval is ill-founded. For one, the post-approval period, especially for “fast tracked” drugs, is 
quite unpredictable. The regulatory compliance defense based on FDA approval is in part 
premised on the notion that pharmaceutical products by their very nature are dynamic and 
unpredictable and that is why we must consider the FDA’s expert opinion to be the best 
indication of product safety.130 For example, “prescription drugs have side-effects that occur in 
such a narrow sub-sample of the population that they do not show up in the NDA process, which 
of necessity is limited to a relatively small sample of the universe of eventual users.”131 Also, 
many side effects are not exposed until substantial lag in time – often longer than the new drug 
application process. Proponents of the defense say that this is precisely why the FDA’s expert 
opinion is superior to litigation – the FDA is in the best situation to minimize ill-effects – and as 
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such, “a manufacturer’s compliance with the FDA optimal deterrence protocol should be taken 
as conclusively presumptive of reasonable design and warning.”132  
 There are definite problems with this assumption. First, the FDA’s regulatory process is 
telling in that it admits the expectation of regular post-approval problems for precisely these 
reasons. The process provides for strict monitoring of post-approval drugs that recently has 
resulted in numerous post-approval recalls or revisions. This is especially true for “fast tracked” 
drugs, which have an even stricter post-approval regime. Impliedly, this admits the fact that the 
pre-approval process is less than optimal, severely undermining the regulatory compliance 
defense. Second, as was briefly mentioned before, at the least, the regulatory compliance defense 
is inapt for the period of time between FDA approval and FDA post-approval recall or revision. 
For example, consider the situation where an injury is caused by an inadequate warning label 
prior to a subsequent revision in the post-approval monitoring period. In this situation a 
regulatory compliance defense should not be applicable. More than likely, in this scenario, either 
the “drug company did not report incoming adverse consequences data to the agency . . . the 
physician-hospital monitoring system – on which both the manufacturer and the agency rely – 
was deficient, or that the agency itself acts less than ‘optimally’ at this relatively informal, 
postlicensing compliance review stage of its process.”133 These are simply not cases in which a 
regulatory compliance defense should apply. 
 Another problem with an FDA regulatory compliance defense is the wide spread practice 
of off-label use. In fact, it has been estimated that forty to sixty percent of all drugs prescribed 
are for off-label uses.134 One might ask: What is the relevance of this with respect to FDA 
approval, drug manufacturer liability, and the regulatory compliance defense when it is the 
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physicians who are prescribing drugs for these off-label uses? The answer is it is extremely 
relevant. The fact is the FDA endorses off label use and considers such uses critical to adequate 
health care.135 Clearly, pharmaceutical manufacturers are aware of the wide-spread off-label use 
of their drugs and the FDA’s endorsement of those uses. Thus, the relevant question is “whether 
the company should have supplied additional information to prescribing physicians on the risks 
associated with the supplemental use, irrespective of its obligation to seek supplemental 
certification from the FDA.”136 Under Michigan’s compliance defense, this question is irrelevant 
since the manufacturer is immune from liability irrespective of the answer. This is yet another 
scenario in which the regulatory compliance defense is wholly inapt.  
 Still another aspect of potential pharmaceutical manufacturer liability that should raise 
concerns over Michigan’s regulatory compliance defense is the ever-increasing controversial 
drug company advertising campaigns. One problem here is the potential for a drug company’s 
aggressive drug advertising campaign to “create[] an atmosphere in which the consumer [is] led 
to disregard the prescribed warning” associated with a particular drug.137 Prior to FDAMA, 
pharmaceutical companies refrained from massive ad campaigns because they were required to 
explicitly state in the media the risks associated with the advertised drug.138 Following FDAMA, 
restrictions on advertising were relaxed and drug companies were merely required to provide 
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collateral sources of risk information.139 The result has been a dramatic increase in the number 
and controversial nature of drug advertisements.140 
 A regulatory compliance defense should not apply in this context because “the contention 
is that an independent basis exists for holding the product supplier responsible that shows no 
disregard for the expertise brought to bear in framing the label or to the virtues of uniformity – a 
contention asserting in effect that the . . . company has consciously fostered inattention to the 
warnings on the package.”141 Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co.142 provides an illustration of such a 
claim where the court held: 
Although the manufacturer or supplier of a prescription drug has a duty to 
adequately warn the medical profession of its dangerous properties or of facts 
which make it likely to be dangerous, an adequate warning to the profession may 
be eroded or even nullified by overpromotion of the drug through a vigorous sales 
program which may have the effect of persuading the prescribing doctor to 
disregard the warnings given.143 
 
This scenario is simply not within the purview of the regulatory compliance defense. All of these 
additional issues further buttress the position that as written, M.C.L. § 600.2946(5) is not well-
founded.  
CONCLUSION 
 In the end, it is telling that other jurisdictions have not followed Michigan’s lead in 
providing a virtual immunity from products liability for pharmaceutical manufacturers via the 
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140 See id. (“In the new advertising climate, prominent figures from the world of sports, entertainment, and politics extol 
the benefits of products such as Viagra and Propecia that promise a lifestyle makeover. Promotional ads likewise 
offer promises to alleviate the miseries of individuals suffering from maladies ranging from allergies to rheumatism. 
Correspondingly, pharmaceutical company budgets for print and TV advertising aimed at potential consumers have 
risen steadily from $595 million in 1996 to $1.3 billion in 1998.”). 
141 See id. at 2081. 
142 507 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1973) 
143 Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661 (Cal. 1973). 
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regulatory compliance defense. Numerous policy considerations weigh heavily against such a 
defense and FDA approval is simply not an adequate foundation for providing immunity to 
pharmaceutical companies. Put simply, despite the arguments in favor of Michigan’s regulatory 
compliance defense, such a defense is “seriously compromised by real-world considerations. . . . 
[and] [p]rescription drug injury claims frequently arise under circumstances that fall outside the 
scope of the ‘comprehensive’ regulatory scheme.”144 Consequently, the Michigan legislature 
should take appropriate actions by either repealing or modifying M.C.L. § 600.2946(5) and do 
away with its current regulatory compliance defense.   
                                                 
144 Rabin, supra note 16, at 2082. 
